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DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION	PROPOSED QUESTIONS RE: REPORT ON THE DDO	REGISTRY
SOURCE HAC		CIA CONTROL NO. 780511
DOC. NO.		DATE DOCUMENT RECEIVED
DOC. DATE RCD 27 MAR 78		27 MAR 78
COPY NO. #1		LOGGED BY
NUMBER OF PAGES 44		KC
NUMBER OF ATTACHMENTS		

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Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP81M00980R003200050042-6

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PROPOSED QUESTIONS RE REPORT ON
DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS OF THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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COMMENT

Not only in the collection of human intelligence but throughout the intelligence community, a commonly recognized defect for years has been the communitywide failure to establish requirements and priorities for program managers with sufficient timeliness and precision as to drive the budget planning and allocation of resources. The former Committee for Foreign Intelligence in its own directive specified such should be done but failed to do it (for the FY 1979 budget). Now it appears the newly formed National Intelligence Tasking Center should have that responsibility. To impact the FY 1980 budget cycle, such guidance should have been issued at the beginning of this current fiscal year (FY 1978) but wasn't. The HUMINT Plan cites the need for such action but doesn't provide for the means to accomplish it. (Pages 8-9; 14-15)

QUESTION

When can it be expected that communitywide requirements and priorities will be issued as budget guidance for program managers early enough in the budget cycle so that budget planning and allocation of resources can be responsive thereto?

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

COMMENT

Our Investigative Staff, in its recently completed study in the Agency's Directorate of Operations, pointed up substantial duplication that exists between the overt collection by the State Department and covert collection of intelligence by the Agency. Their observations were reinforced by views of CIA and IC Staff officials. One IC Staff official estimated that 30 to 50 percent of CIA's reporting upon host country matters could be avoided or as readily accomplished by embassy representatives if they were properly tasked to do so. (Pages 16-18; 26-36)

QUESTIONS

1. What action is being taken to clearly define the intelligence that can be collected overtly versus that which can only be collected covertly and then to segregate the requirements so that duplicative activity by Agency officers and Foreign Service Officers overseas will be avoided?

2. Why should not the Clandestine Service be oriented only toward clandestine activities, i.e., espionage, serving strategic intelligence needs, and the collection of current intelligence be left to the overt agencies, principally the Foreign Service?

TOP SECRET

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Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP81M00980R003200050042-6

TOP SECRET

COMMENT

CIA has no system for tracking requirements for intelligence collection that are received from its customers--either at headquarters or in the field. Thus, it has no way of determining the portion of intelligence collection responsive to requirements or simply self-generated. The result is a lack of management to determine the impact of requirements upon resource allocation and expenditure of officer time. (Pages 85-87)

QUESTION

Would not the establishment of some system of tracking requirements received from customers enable you to better manage the impact of requirements upon resource allocation and expenditure of officer time?

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

COMMENT

The Operating Directive to each field station prioritizing objectives and prescribing the areas of interest to which their efforts must be directed during the operating year frequently causes "wheelspinning" at the station level because of the inclusion of unrealistic targets or objectives to which the station must assign manpower so as to show responsiveness by year-end to its operating directive on which it is judged. The inclusion of objectives against which there is no realistic chance of success artificially drives manpower needs in the field. (Pages 89-96)

QUESTION

Cannot field manning be reduced by more disciplined management of the objectives included in each station's operating directive to give chiefs of stations more input to inclusion or noninclusion of objectives, avoiding forced assignment of manpower to objectives that have no realistic chance of success, and meeting targets of opportunity when they arise rather than requiring day-to-day manpower on unrealistic objectives?

TOP SECRET

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP81M00980R003200050042-6

Next 4 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP81M00980R003200050042-6

TOP SECRET

COMMENT

According to information supplied to the Committee in May 1976, the Standardized Reports Grading System (SRGS) "was instituted to enable managers at periodic MBO hearings to examine quality trends of reporting and facilitate uniform review of the intelligence performance of the Directorate." The Investigative Staff found that SRGS was generally regarded as a quality control mechanism that had succeeded in reducing the high volume of marginal reporting but because of the subjectivity of the grading, it is of no use as a means of examining and evaluating, on a directorate-wide basis, the performance of the various divisions in the collection and reporting of intelligence. (Pages 153-155)

QUESTIONS

1. Aside from reducing marginal reporting, of what real value is SRGS?

2. Has any management decision ever been predicated on SRGS results?

3. In the Hearings on the FY 1977 budget, glowing reports were made to the Committee on both Management by Objectives and the Standardized Reports Grading System, as if they were great panaceas that were going to solve the Clandestine Service's problems. We find our suspicions confirmed that both enjoy quite low reputations within the Service itself. Do you gentlemen not realize that when bureaucratic attempts are made to pull wool over the eyes of Committee members, that we usually see rather quickly through the warp and the woof?

TOP SECRET

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COMMENT

The Investigative Staff found that, although a large portion of the intelligence reporting produced by the Clandestine Service could have been collected overtly if the overt collectors were tasked with such collection, there is no regular evaluation procedure designed to identify such reporting. (Page 160)

QUESTIONS

1. Is the Evaluation Group of the Clandestine Service taking any steps to identify blocks of intelligence reporting that could better be collected from overt sources?

2. If this could successfully be done, would it not result in reductions of manpower?

TOP SECRET

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Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP81M00980R003200050042-6

Next 29 Page(s) In Document Exempt

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